

**GA 1550:**  
**Comparative Politics of Industrialized Democracies**  
**Fall 2021**  
**Mon 10-11.50am**  
**Room: 19 West 4th St., Room 217**

This course is designed to help students develop an appreciation of what it takes to generate high-quality research and writing in a particular area of comparative politics: the politics of representative government in advanced, industrialized democracies. To facilitate this, we will read and discuss published work in four categories, beginning with voters, then moving to electoral systems and their effects, parties in the electorate and legislature, and finally, the politics of governance. These categories represent just a sample of topics that have received sustained attention by comparative politics scholars and are by no means exhaustive. Nor are they mutually exclusive: one of the goals of the course is to encourage students to consider how conclusions drawn in one area of research might influence the questions asked and answers offered in another.

Within each of these four categories, we will read a mix of work that has had a large impact on the field or can be considered to be at the frontier. Again, time constraints prevent us from reading all or even most of the work that can be said to fall into these categories. The main objectives of the course are to better understand why the authors tackled the questions they did and how they went about crafting answers to those questions and evaluating those answers. By reading and critiquing a sample of high-quality work in these four categories, the course aims to equip students with the foundational knowledge and analytical skills required to come up with their own research questions, craft their own contributions, implement their own cutting-edge empirical analysis, and ultimately produce papers publishable in top comparative politics journals.

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**Instructor:**

**Amy Catalinac**

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Office Hours: Tues 10am-12pm.

Location: Room 315, 19 West 4th St.

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**Course Requirements:**

**1. Participation (20%)**

This course is discussion-based; thus, it depends heavily on your participation. Sessions will consist of in-depth discussion of each of the assigned readings. There will be no lectures. Students should come prepared to contribute to this discussion in ways that demonstrate first that they have understood **what each reading was trying to do and why** (meaning,

what larger literature or substantive puzzle about the world motivated the author(s) to write their paper); and second, that they have given serious thought to the question of **whether, in their view, this goal was realized.**

To this end, students must read the material carefully ahead of time, taking notes that will allow them to contribute to discussion of each of these two points. When reading, students should ask themselves: What substantive puzzle or theoretical debate motivated the authors to write the paper? How does the paper attempt to solve this puzzle or contribute to this debate? What approach is used and why? Are you convinced of the paper's findings, or are there aspects of the analyses that give us pause? Why? How could the approach be improved? How generalizable are the findings of the paper, whether to other settings, other policy areas, and other realms of inquiry of interest to comparative politics scholars? Students are encouraged to practise succinctly summarizing each article's goal, approach, and findings ahead of time.

If a student has to miss a session for illness or another legitimate reason, please inform me ahead of time. The instructor reserves the right to ask any student who is absent to submit written answers to questions about the material assigned for that week.

## 2. **Two Response Papers (20%)**

To facilitate your understanding of the literature and ability to critically engage with its substantive and theoretical contributions, students will submit response papers in two of the weeks. Response papers should not summarize the material, but offer a commentary or critique of one or more (non-methodological) aspects of it. Response papers could draw out connections between the papers, highlight how they do or not do hang together, and identify lingering questions that students may feel were not answered satisfactorily. Please keep these to a maximum of two pages and submit them to the instructor via email by 8am the morning of class.

## 3. **One Referee Report (10%)**

Students will also be expected to write a referee report, about a single paper that is not in a week the student is writing a response paper. Your referee report is to be kept to a maximum of three pages and is due to the Instructor via email by 8am of the morning of class.

In your referee report, you are to treat the article as if it had been submitted to a journal and you have been asked to review it. Your report should evaluate the contribution of the paper and the methodological rigor with which the goals it set were achieved. You will need to assess the paper's weaknesses (whether in contribution, substance, or methodological rigor) and decide whether you believe the author should be offered the opportunity to address those weaknesses or whether they constitute a hurdle too large to overcome. I will be circulating a 'best practice' guide to serving as a journal referee.

## 4. **Final Paper (50%)**

Students are expected to write a final paper. This paper is not intended as a tiresome hoop through which you have to jump, but as an integral part of the portfolio of work you will

develop during your time as a graduate student. To this end, the paper can be on any comparative politics topic of interest. Ideally, students will use the course as an opportunity to produce the first draft of something that could, after more time and effort has been expended, become a published paper of comparable quality to one of the articles we have read. Note that finding a precise, relevant, challenging, yet feasible substantive question is one of the most difficult tasks facing any political scientist. Students are encouraged to begin thinking about their final paper immediately, guided by their substantive interests, intuitions and background knowledge, as well as the talents they will bring to bear on the work, all of which will need to be exploited to the fullest extent. Students should set themselves the very-highest standards and find topics upon which they are prepared to make a substantial investment of time, effort and creative energy.

I am open to the following two types of final papers:

- The first draft of a *research article* akin to those we read in the course. Research articles usually aim to break new ground theoretically, empirically, or both. They can bring new data to bear on an old question. They can pose a new question and show how old theories can be used (or adapted) to answer them. Research articles are not purely theoretical papers, nor are they purely descriptive (describing a particular phenomena or political system). Typically, research articles will involve the collection and analysis of new data, or new methodologies applied to existing data. The instructor understands that any research articles written within the confines of the course will need more work before they are publishable.
- A *research design paper*, intended to become a prospectus. This lays out the research question, motivates this question (ideally, with real-world examples), lays out the relevant literature (remember, you will sometimes need to decide *what* the literature would say about *your* research question), offers your theory and hypotheses, and offers a plan for empirically testing this, whether with observational or experimental data, on one or more countries.

Regardless of type, your paper should include the following:

- (a) Motivation: why is answering your question important?
- (b) Background/context: have other people already tried to answer this question? If so, what theories have they drawn on, what answers have they given, and why are those answers invalid or incomplete? Why is more work on this question needed?
- (c) Theoretical expectations/hypotheses: describe your own theory/theoretical approach. Use this to deduce precise empirical observations or hypotheses that can be tested with data.
- (d) Data: consider the kind of data that would provide the very best test of your hypotheses, if you had access to it. If such data are unavailable (as is often the case), consider whether other data sets could provide a credible test of your hypotheses. If no suitable data exists, specify a feasible research project that would enable you to gather the required evidence.
- (e) Method/analysis: draw clear inferences about what your data tell you about your hypotheses and thus about the research question that motivates your project.

- (f) Conclusion: What conclusions have you been able to draw from your research? Under what conditions might your conclusions not be warranted? What relevance do your conclusions hold for existing work in the field? Has your research raised new questions for others to answer?

Your paper should be approximately 25 pages, double-spaced. It is due via email on Friday, December 17 (by 5pm) and will count for 40% of your grade. In preparation for this, you will also submit a written prospectus via email to me on Wednesday, December 1 (by 5pm). In this, you will describe the question you will try to answer in your paper, explain why this question matters, and sketch out brief answers to (b) through (d) above. I expect the prospectus to be approximately two pages of writing (double-spaced), plus one additional page for the bibliography. There will be a substantial penalty for late work, so please place these dates on your calendar and treat them as fixed. Please consult the [NYU Citation Guide](#) for information about the referencing style you will need to use, which is the Chicago author-date system, and for general information on how to properly cite sources.

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### Grade Breakdown:

Participation .....	20%
Two Response Papers .....	20%
One Referee Report .....	10%
Final paper .....	50%

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### Important Dates:

Class Begins .....	Mon Sep 13
Paper Prospectus Due .....	Wed Dec 1 5pm
Last Day of Class .....	Mon Dec 6
Final Paper Due .....	Fri Dec 17 5pm

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## COURSE OUTLINE

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### Sep 13: Introduction

This is an organizational meeting. We will cover the goals of the course and my expectations of students. Each student will be assigned to lead discussion in one week. Each student will also be assigned to two readings to provide referee reports on. There is no assigned reading, but if students are interested, the following pieces about comparative politics may be of interest.

*Background/Supplementary Reading:*

Adam Przeworski. Institutions matter? *Government and Opposition*, 39(4):527–540, September 2004.

Adam Przeworski. Is the Science of Comparative Politics Possible? In Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, editors, *The Oxford handbook of Comparative Politics*. 2009.

Thomas B Pepinsky. The Return of the Single-Country Study. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 22:187–203, 2019.

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**PART I: VOTERS**

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**Sep 20: Policy Preferences**

Michael Tomz and Robert P Van Houweling. Candidate Positioning and Voter Choice. *American Political Science Review*, 102(3), 2008.

Orit Kedar. When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancing in Parliamentary Elections. *American Political Science Review*, 99:185–99, 2005.

Lawrence Ezrow and Georgios Xezonakis. Citizen satisfaction with democracy and parties' policy offerings. *Comparative Political Studies*, 44(9):1152–1178, 2011.

*Background/Supplementary Reading:*

Stuart Elaine Macdonald, George Rabinowitz, and Ola Listhaug. On Attempting to Rehabilitate the Proximity Model: Sometimes the Patient Just Can't Be Helped. *The Journal of Politics*, 60(3):653–90, 1998.

Stephen A. Jessee. Spatial Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election. *American Political Science Review*, 103(1):59–81, 2009.

James F. Adams, Samuel Merrill, and Bernard Grofman. *A Unified Theory of Party Competition: A Cross-National Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioral Factors*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005.

Raymond M. Duch, Jeff B. May, and David A. Armstrong II. Coalition-directed Voting in Multiparty Democracies. *The American Political Science Review*, 104(4):698–719, 2010.

James Adams, Lawrence Ezrow, and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. Is Anybody Listening? Evidence That Voters Do Not Respond to European Parties' Policy Statements During Elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(2):370–382, 2011.

Eric Belanger and Bonnie D. Meguid. Issue salience, issue ownership, and issue-based vote choice. *Electoral Studies*, 27:477–491, 2008.

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### Sep 27: Valence Considerations

Michael Clark and Debra Leiter. Does the Ideological Dispersion of Parties Mediate the Electoral Impact of Valence? A Cross-National Study of Party Support in Nine Western European Democracies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(2):171–202, 2013.

Spyros Kosmidis, Sara B Hobolt, Eamonn Molloy, and Stephen Whitefield. Party competition and emotive rhetoric. *Comparative Political Studies*, 52(6):811–837, 2019.

Walter J. Stone and Elizabeth N. Simas. Candidate Valence and Ideological Positions in U.S. House Elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(2):371–388, 2010.

#### *Background/Supplementary Reading:*

Tim Groseclose. A model of candidate location when one candidate has a valence advantage. *American Journal of Political Science*, 45(3):862–86, 2001.

Stephen Ansolabehere and James M. Snyder. Valence politics and equilibrium in spatial election models. *Public Choice*, 103:327–36, 2000.

Norman Schofield. A Valence Model of Political Competition in Britain: 1992-1997. *Electoral Studies*, 24(3):347–370, 2005.

Michael Clark. Valence and electoral outcomes in Western Europe, 1976–1998. *Electoral Studies*, 28:111–122, 2009.

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### Oct 4: Retrospective Voting, Ambiguity, Ruling Party Status

Michael M. Bechtel and Jens Hainmueller. How Lasting Is Voter Gratitude? An Analysis of the Short- and Long-Term Electoral Returns to Beneficial Policy. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(4):852–868, 2011.

Michael Tomz and Robert P Van Houweling. The Electoral Implications of Candidate Ambiguity. *American Political Science Review*, 103(1), 2009.

Kathleen Bawn and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. Government versus Opposition at the Polls: How Governing Status Affects the Impact of Policy Positions. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(2):433–446, 2012.

*Background/Supplementary Reading:*

Andrew Healy and Neil Malhotra. Retrospective Voting Reconsidered. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 16(1):285–306, 2013.

Torben Iversen and David Soskice. Information, inequality, and mass polarization. *Comparative Political Studies*, 48(13):1781–1813, 2015.

Raymond M. Duch and Randolph T. Stevenson. Assessing the Magnitude of the Economic Vote Over Time and Across Nations. *Electoral Studies*, 25:528–547, 2006.

Zeynep Somer-Topcu, Margit Tavits, and Markus Baumann. Does party rhetoric affect voter perceptions of party positions? *Electoral Studies*, 65:102153, 2020.

Taishi Muraoka and Guillermo Rosas. Does economic inequality drive voters' disagreement about party placement? *American Journal of Political Science*, 2020.

James Lo, Sven-Oliver Proksch, and Jonathan B. Slapin. Ideological Clarity in Multiparty Competition: A New Measure and Test Using Election Manifestos. *British Journal of Political Science*, pages 1–20, 2014.

Mark Andreas Kayser and Michael Peress. Benchmarking across Borders: Electoral Accountability and the Necessity of Comparison. *American Political Science Review*, 106(3), 2012.

Susan C. Stokes. Public Opinion and Market Reforms: The Limits of Economic Voting. *Comparative Political Studies*, 29:499–519, 1996.

G Bingham Powell Jr and Guy D Whitten. A Cross-national Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context. *American Journal of Political Science*, pages 391–414, 1993.

Joshua Tucker. *Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Czech Republic, 1990-1999*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006.

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## PART II: ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND THEIR EFFECTS

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### Oct 12: On Campaigns and Turnout

John Carey and Matthew Shugart. Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas. *Electoral Studies*, 14:417–39, 1995.

Amy Catalinac. Positioning Under Alternative Electoral Systems: Evidence From Japanese Candidate Election Manifestos. *American Political Science Review*, forthcoming, 2017.

Gary Cox, Jon Fiva, and Daniel M. Smith. The Contraction Effect: How Proportional Representation Affects Mobilization and Turnout. *The Journal of Politics*, 78(4), 2016.

*Background/Supplementary Reading:*

Gary W. Cox. Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 34(4):903–935, 1990.

Maurice Duverger. *Political Parties*. Wiley, New York, 1954.

Roger B Myerson. Incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems. *American Political Science Review*, 87(4):856–869, 1993.

Gary W. Cox. *Making Votes Count*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 1997.

Kenneth Benoit and Michael Laver. *Party Policy in Modern Democracies*. Routledge, London, UK, 2006.

B. Grofman and A. Lijphart. *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences*. Agathon Press, New York, 1986.

Andrew C. Eggers. Proportionality and Turnout: Evidence From French Municipalities. *Comparative Political Studies*, 48(2):135–167, 2014.

Taishi Muraoka and Joan Barcelo. The effect of district magnitude on turnout: Quasi-experimental evidence from nonpartisan elections under sntv. *Party Politics*, 25(4):632–639, 2019.

Lawrence Ezrow. Parties' Policy Programmes and the Dog that Didn't Bark: No Evidence that Proportional Systems Promote Extreme Party Positioning. *British Journal of Political Science*, 38(3):479–497, 2008.

John Huber. Measuring ethnic voting: Do proportional electoral laws politicize ethnicity? *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(4):986–1001, 2012.

Jay K. Dow. Party-System Extremism in Majoritarian and Proportional Electoral Systems. *British Journal of Political Science*, 41(2):341–361, 2011.

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**Oct 18: On Policy and Particularism**

Torben Iversen and David Soskice. Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others. *American Political Science Review*, 100(2):165–81, 2006.



Tanya Bagashka and Jennifer Hayes Clark. Electoral Rules and Legislative Particularism: Evidence from U.S. State Legislatures. *American Political Science Review*, 110(3):441–56, 2016.

Frank C. Thames and Martin S. Edwards. Differentiating Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. Mixed-Member Majoritarian and Mixed-Member Proportional Systems and Government Expenditures. *Comparative Political Studies*, 39(7):905–927, 2006.

*Background/Supplementary Reading:*

Jessica Fortin-Rittberger and Berthold Rittberger. Do electoral rules matter? Explaining national differences in women’s representation in the European Parliament. *European Union Politics*, 15(4):496–520, 2014.

Frances Rosenbluth and Ross Schaap. The Domestic Politics of Banking Regulation. *International Organization*, 57(2):307–336, 2003.

Burt L. Monroe and Amanda G. Rose. Electoral Systems and Unimagined Consequences: Partisan Effects of Districted Proportional Representation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(1):67–89, 2002.

Arend Lijphart. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in thirty-six Countries*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1999.

Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. *Political Economics. Explaining Economic Policy*. MIT Press, 2002.

Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, Robert Perotti, and Massimo Rostagno. Electoral Systems and the Composition of Public Spending. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117:609–57, 2002.

Torsten Persson, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabellini. Electoral Rules, Government Spending, and Parliamentary Democracy. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 2:155–18, 2007.

Alessandro Lizzeri and Nicola Persico. The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives. *The American Economic Review*, 91(1):225–239, March 2001.

Patricia Funk and Christina Gathmann. How Do Electoral Systems Affect Fiscal Policy? Evidence from Cantonal Parliaments, 1890–2000. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 11(5):1178–1203, 2013.

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**Oct 25: On Distributive Politics**

Stephanie J Rickard. Electoral Systems, Voters’ Interests and Geographic Dispersion. *British Journal of Political Science*, pages 855–877, 2012.

Amy Catalinac and Lucia Motolinia. Geographically-Targeted Spending in Mixed-Member Majoritarian Electoral Systems. *World Politics*, 73(4), 2021.

Miriam Golden. Electoral Connections: The Effects of the Personal Vote on Political Patronage, Bureaucracy and Legislation in Postwar Italy. *British Journal of Political Science*, 33:189–212, 2003.

*Background/Supplementary Reading:*

Andrew C Eggers and Jens Hainmueller. MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics. *American Political Science Review*, pages 513–533, 2009.

Miriam Golden and Brian Min. Distributive Politics Around the World. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 16, 2013.

Shigeo Hirano. Electoral Institutions, Hometowns, and Favored Minorities: Evidence from Japanese Electoral Reforms. *World Politics*, 58:51–82, October 2006.

Margit Tavits. Geographically-Targeted Spending: Exploring the Electoral Strategies of Incumbent Governments. *European Political Science Review*, 1(1):103–123, 2009.

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**Nov 1: Endogeneity of Electoral Systems**

Carles Boix. Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies. *The American Political Science Review*, 93(3):609–24, 1999.

Thomas R. Cusack, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems. *The American Political Science Review*, 101(3):373–91, 2007.

Kenneth Mori McElwain. Manipulating Electoral Rules to Manufacture Single-Party Dominance. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(1):32–47, 2008.

*Background/Supplementary Reading:*

Lucas Leemann and Isabela Mares. The adoption of proportional representation. *The Journal of Politics*, 76(2):461–478, 2014.

Kenneth Benoit and Jacqueline Hayden. Institutional Change and Persistence: The Evolution of Poland’s Electoral System, 1989-2001. *The Journal of Politics*, 66(2):396–427, 2004.

Gary W Cox, Jon H Fiva, and Daniel M Smith. Parties, legislators, and the origins of proportional representation. *Comparative Political Studies*, 52(1):102–133, 2019.

Andre Blais, Agnieszka Dobrzynska, and Indridi H. Indridason. To Adopt or Not to Adopt Proportional Representation: The Politics of Institutional Choice. *British Journal of Political Science*, 35(1):182–90, 2005.

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## PART III: PARTIES

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### Nov 8: In the Electorate

James M. Snyder and Michael M. Ting. An Informational Rationale for Political Parties. *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(1):90–110, 2002.

Bonnie M Meguid. Competition between unequals: The role of mainstream party strategy in niche party success. *American Political Science Review*, 99(3):347–359, 2005.

Kathleen Bawn, Martin Cohen, David Karol, Seth Masket, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. A theory of political parties: Groups, policy demands and nominations in American politics. *Perspectives on Politics*, 10(3):571–597, 2012.

#### *Background/Supplementary Reading:*

Miriam A. Golden and Lucio Picci. Pork-Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953-94. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(2):268–289, 2008.

Susan C Stokes. Political parties and democracy. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2(1):243–267, 1999.

Nolan McCarty and Eric Schickler. On the theory of parties. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 21:175–193, 2018.

Joost Van Spanje and Nan Dirk De Graaf. How established parties reduce other parties' electoral support: the strategy of parroting the pariah. *West European Politics*, 41(1):1–27, 2018.

Thomas Poguntke, Susan E Scarrow, Paul D Webb, Elin H Allern, Nicholas Aylott, Ingrid Van Biezen, Enrico Calossi, Marina Costa Lobo, William P Cross, Kris Deschouwer, et al. Party rules, party resources and the politics of parliamentary democracies: How parties organize in the 21st century. *Party politics*, 22(6):661–678, 2016.

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### Nov 15: In the Legislature

John M. Carey. Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1):92–107, 2007.

Torun Dewan and Arthur Spirling. Strategic Opposition and Government Cohesion in Westminster Democracies. *American Political Science Review*, 105(2):337–58, 2011.

Shane Martin. Electoral institutions, the personal vote, and legislative organization. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 36(3):339–361, 2011.

*Background/Supplementary Reading:*

Daniel Diermeier and Razvan Vlaicu. Parties, Coalitions, and the Internal Organization of Legislatures. *American Political Science Review*, 105(2):359–80, 2011.

Christopher J. Kam. *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009.

Alexandra Cirone and Brenda Van Coppenolle. Bridging the gap: Lottery-based procedures in early parliamentarization. *World politics*, 71(2):197–235, 2019.

Michael F. Thies. On the Primacy of Party in Government. In Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, editors, *Parties without Partisans: Political change in Advanced Industrialized Democracies*. Oxford University Press, 2000.

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## PART IV: GOVERNANCE

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### Nov 22: Government Formation and Duration

Lanny W. Martin and Randolph T. Stevenson. Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies. *American Journal of Political Science*, 45(1):33–50, 2001.

Petra Schleiter and Margit Tavits. The Electoral Benefits of Opportunistic Election Timing. *The Journal of Politics*, 78(3):836–850, 2016.

Charles T. McClean. The Element of Surprise: Election Timing and Opposition Preparedness. *Comparative Political Studies*, 2021.

*Background/Supplementary Reading:*

Daniel Diermeier and Randolph T. Stevenson. Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events. *American Political Science Review*, 94(3):627–40, 2000.

Lanny W. Martin and Randolph T. Stevenson. The Conditional Impact of Incumbency on Government Formation. *American Political Science Review*, 104(3):503–18, 2010.

Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle. *Making and Breaking Government*. Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Michael Laver. Models of government formation. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1(1):1–25, 1998.

Kaare Strom, Wolfgang C. Muller, and Torbjorn Bergman, editors. *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: the Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008.

- David P. Baron. A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems. *American Political Science Review*, 85(1):137–164, 1991.
- Samuel Berlinski, Torun Dewan, and Keith Dowding. The Impact of Individual and Collective Performance on Ministerial Tenure. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(2):559–571, 2010.
- Lanny W Martin and Randolph T Stevenson. Government formation in parliamentary democracies. *American Journal of Political Science*, pages 33–50, 2001.
- Zeev Maoz and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. Political Polarization and Cabinet Stability in Multiparty Systems: A Social Networks Analysis of European Parliaments, 1945–98. *British Journal of Political Science*, 40(4):805–33, 2010.
- Henning Bergmann, Hanna Bäck, and Thomas Saalfeld. Party-system polarisation, legislative institutions and cabinet survival in 28 parliamentary democracies, 1945–2019. *West European Politics*, pages 1–19, 2021.
- Josh Cutler, Scott De Marchi, Max Gallop, Florian M Hollenbach, Michael Laver, and Matthias Orłowski. Cabinet formation and portfolio distribution in european multiparty systems. *British Journal of Political Science*, 46(1):31–43, 2016.
- Torun Dewan and Rafael Hortala-Vallve. The three As of government formation: Appointment, allocation, and assignment. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(3):610–627, 2011.
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## Nov 29: Portfolio Allocation

- Paul V. Warwick and James N. Druckman. The portfolio allocation paradox: An investigation into the nature of a very strong but puzzling relationship. *European Journal of Political Research*, 45:635–65, 2006.
- Royce Carroll and Gary W. Cox. The Logic of Gamson’s Law: Pre-Election Coalitions and Portfolio Allocations. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(2):300–13, 2007.
- John D. Huber and Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo. Replacing Cabinet Ministers: Patterns of Ministerial Stability in Parliamentary Democracies. *American Political Science Review*, 102(2):169–80, 2008.

### *Background/Supplementary Reading:*

- Robert J. Pekkanen, Benjamin Nyblade, and Ellis S. Krauss. The Logic of Ministerial Selection: Electoral System and Cabinet Appointments in Japan. *Social Science Japan Journal*, 17(1):3–22, 2014.
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## Dec 6: Politics of Coalitions

Lanny M. Martin and George Vanberg. Parties and Policymaking in Multiparty Governments: The Legislative Median, Ministerial Autonomy, and the Coalition Compromise. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(4):979–96, 2014.

Royce Carroll and Gary W. Cox. Shadowing Ministers: Monitoring Partners in Coalition Governments. *Comparative Political Studies*, 45(2):220–236, 2012.

Shaun Bowler, Indridi H Indridason, Thomas Bräuninger, and Marc Debus. Let’s just agree to disagree: dispute resolution mechanisms in coalition agreements. *The Journal of Politics*, 78(4):1264–1278, 2016.

### *Background/Supplementary Reading:*

Jose Maria Maravall. Accountability in Coalition Governments. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 13:81–100, 2010.

Lanny W Martin and Georg Vanberg. What you see is not always what you get: Bargaining before an audience under multiparty government. *American Political Science Review*, 114(4):1138–1154, 2020.

Tiberiu Dragu and Michael Laver. Coalition governance with incomplete information. *The Journal of Politics*, 81(3):923–936, 2019.

Royce Carroll and Gary W. Cox. Shadowing Ministers: Monitoring Partners in Coalition Governments. *Comparative Political Studies*, 45(2):220–236, 2012.

Jorge M Fernandes, Florian Meinfelder, and Catherine Moury. Wary partners: Strategic portfolio allocation and coalition governance in parliamentary democracies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 49(9):1270–1300, 2016.

Michael Laver and Norman Schofield. *Multiparty Government: the Politics of Coalition in Europe*. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1998.

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## Dec 13: No meeting (work on final papers)